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FIFTH AMENDMENT-DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND THE
SINGLE TRIBUNAL RULE
Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497 (1978).
Swisher v. Brady, 98 S. Ct. 2699 (1978).

INTRODUCTION

mistrial was held not to have violated the double
jeopardy clause, the Court based its decision on
either a jusifiable finding of manifest necessity by
the trial judge6 or the defendant's own election of
mistrial. Arizona v. Washington made two significant
departures from these standards. First, the Court
drew an implication of manifest necessity from the
facts of the case without any relevent specific findings by the trial judge. Second, the Court added a
new ground upon which the finding of manifest
necessity could be based: misconduct by the defense attorney.s That particular rationale for declaring a mistrial falls uncomfortably close to the
risk of abuse which gave rise to the prohibition
against reprosecution following a mistrial?
In Swisherv. Brady,10 the second important related
case of this term, the Court held that the juvenile
trial system of Baltimore, Maryland did not violate
the double jeopardy constraints of the fifth amendment by allowing a state's attorney to take exceptions to a master's proposed finding of non-delinquency and to demand a hearing on the record by
a supervising judge. The Court determined that a
defendant's right to one trial before a single fact-

Throughout its rulings on the fifth amendment
protection against double jeopardy,' the Supreme
Court has held that implicated in that protection
is "a defendant's valued right to have his trial
completed by a particular tribunal.",2 The right to
a single adjudication of guilt or innocence before
a single tribunal, however, has never been accorded
the same absolute status in double jeopardy considerations as has the finality of a verdict of acquittal,
rendered on the merits of a case. The Supreme
Court has developed a number of exceptions to the
"single tribunal" rule. These exceptions have been
based on such concerns as the public's interest in
fair trials3 and the state's interest in legitimate state
policies.4
The ambiguities in the status of the right to a
complete trial before one discrete factfinder have
been increased by two cases decided by the Supreme Court in the 1977 term, which interpret
and, to some extent, restrict that right. In Arizona
v.Washington,5 the Court held that a mistrial declared by the trial judge, based on improper remarks by defense counsel in his opening statement,
did not bar retrial due to former jeopardy, even
6Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949); Thompson v.
though the defendant objected to the mistrial rulStates, 155 U.S. 271 (1894); Simmons v. United
United
ing. In previous cases where reprosecution after a States, 142 U.S. 148 (1891); United States v. Perez, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824).
I"[Nor shall any person be subject for the same
7 United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600 (1976).
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.... "
8The trial court in Dinitz also based its mistrial ruling
on misconduct by the defense attorney. However, in that
U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
2Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684,689 (1949). The Wade case the defendant was given a choice of accepting a
Court went on to note, however, that this valued right
mistrial or proceeding with his other counsel conducting
was subordinate in some cases to the public's interest in the case. The defendant opted for a mistrial and the
fair trials and just judgments. The court held that a Supreme Court based its ruling that the defendant's
second trial was not barred in a court-martial proceeding valued right to a single trial was not offended on the
which was transferred from the Third to the Fifteenth ground that the mistrial ruling was at the behest of the
Army due to military exigencies created by the invasion
defendant. The Court did not consider the issue of
of Germany.
whether misconduct by the defendant's attorney could
3id.
provide the basis for a ruling of manifest necessity that
4Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973). The state
would justify declaring a mistrial over the defendant's
policy which, according to the Court, outweighed the objection. Id at 601-11.
defendant's interest in a continuing trial, was the require9 The original basis for prohibiting a retrial after the
ment under Illinois law that the defendant in a criminal declaration of a mistrial was to prevent a judge or
case be tried only on indictment of a grand jury. This prosecutor from aborting a trial when it appeared likely
policy prevented a mid-trial amendment of a defective that the jury intended to acquit a defendant who the
indictment and necessitated a mistrial.
state believed was guilty. 434 U.S. at 507-08.
'098 S. Ct. 2699 (1978).
5 434 U.S. 497 (1978).
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finding body was not violated by Baltimore's present system, for, as the Court reasoned, the judge
and master system constituted an ongoing process
and not two discrete trials. Finally, the Court noted
that none of the underlying reasons for the prohibition against repeated trials were implicated in
the Maryland system. This decision calls into serious question the status of this "valued right"" to
one trial before a single factfinding body and confuses the definition of a single tribunal.
The doctrinal history of the defendant's right to
protection against repeated trials, even where those
trials fail to end in a verdict, provides insight into
the ambiguity inherent in the status of that right.
In English law, the doctrine was not part of the
double jeopardy prohibition; instead, it was a rule
ofjury practice, 12 which mandated that once ajury.
was impaneled, it could not be dismissed. The rule
evolved, however, into a protection against the
abusive judicial and prosecutorial practice of discharging a jury whenever an acquittal seemed
likely. 3 In American law, the protection was incorporated into the double jeopardy rule through
15
United States v. Perez14 and Wade v.Hunter.

The policies underlying the prevention of mul" 336 U.S. at 689.
12The rule arose in the context of hung juries. Civil as

well as criminal juries were required to remain impaneled
until they rendered a verdict. Crist v. Bretz, U.S. 98 S.
Ct. 2156, 2163-64 (1978) (Powell, J., dissenting).
'3 Id. at 2164.
1422 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 579. Doublejeopardy was not
explicitly mentioned in the case. The Court simply held

tiple prosecutions for the same offense serve equally
well as a rationale for guaranteeing the defendant
a single trial before a single factfinding body. The
policies involved in each of these aspects of double
jeopardy reflect a judgment that actual guilt or
innocence, rather than the overwhelming resources
of the government, should determine the outcome
of a trial. Guilt should be established by one trial
conducted in the adversary tradition and should
not be the result of the "odds" that at least one of
several factfinders who hear the case will be persuaded by the prosecutor. Moreover, successive
prosecutions can easily become a weapon for harassment in the hands of the government or a means
of punishing an uncooperative defendant. Finally,
multiple prosecutions allow the state an opportunity to refine its evidence so that it can present a

better case at subsequent trials.' 6
As both the Arizona and Swisher cases indicate,

however, the right to be tried by a single tribunal
does not receive the same treatment by the courts

as does the protection against a subsequent prosecution for the same offense after conviction or
acquittal. The protection against reprosecution
after acquittal is absolute. But, the right to a trial

before a single tribunal is subject to a balancing of
interests, because "at times the valued right of a
defendant to have his trial completed by the particular tribunal summoned to sit in judgment on
him may be subordinated to the public interest
'17
when there is an imperious necessity to do so.
THE STANDARDS FOR DETERMINING THE

that retrials are not barred by a mistrial declared on the

PERMISSIBILITY OF REPROSECUTION AFTER A

basis of a hung jury as long as there was a manifest

necessity for the discharge of the jury. The following
language, however, has been repeatedly quoted by the
courts in ruling on the double jeopardy implications of a
mistrial:
We think, that in all cases of this nature, the law
has invested Courts of justice with the authority to
discharge a jury from giving any verdict, whenever,
in their opinion, taking all the circumstances into
consideration, there is manifest necessity for the act,
or the ends of public justice would otherwise be
defeated. They are to exercise a sound discretion on
the subject; and it is impossible to define all the
circumstances, which would render it proper to
interfere. To be sure, the power ought to be used
with the greatest caution under urgent circumstances, and for very plain and obvious causes... .
But, after all, they have the right to order the
discharge; and the security which the public have
for the faithful, sound, and conscientious exercise of
this discretion, rests, in this as in other cases, upon
the responsibility of the Judges, under their oaths of
office.
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 580.
15336 U. S. at 689.
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MISTRIAL

In Arizona v. Washington,'

8

the Supreme Court

applied the "manifest necessity" standard in deter16

Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957). The

court said:
The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained
in at least the Anglo-American system ofjurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and
power should not be allowed to make repeated
attempts to convict an individual for an alleged
offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment,
expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a
continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well
as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent, he may be found guilty.
335 U.S. at 187. See also 75 YA1. L.J. 262 (1965).
17372 U.S. 734, 736 (1963).
"The defendant in Arizona v. Washington was being
tried for the murder of a hotel night clerk. His original
conviction was overturned when the prosecution withheld
exculpatory materials to which the defendant was entitled under the Supreme Court ruling in Brady v. Mary-

SUPREME COURT REVIEW

mining that the public's interest in a fair trial sity for a mistrial or the possible alternatives. The
outweighed the defendant's right to pursue a ver- United States Supreme Court reversed and held
dict from the original jury at a single trial. The that a finding of manifest necessity could be imCourt ruled that it was possible to imply from the plied from the record. The Court reasoned that the
facts of the case that a mistrial had been necessi- court of appeals had used an overly exacting and
tated by d.'nse counsel's improper and possibly
technical standard and had failed to give proper
prejudicial opening remarks. In Arizona, defense deference to the trial judge who had been "in the
counsel had commented on the fact that the de- best position to assess all the factors which must be
fendant's initial conviction had been overturned
considered in making a necessarily discretionary
because the prosecution had withheld exculpatory determination whether the jury will be able 'to
'
evidence.19 The trial judge granted the prosecutor's reach a just verdict if it continues to deliberate. 4
In Perez v.United States,?s the Supreme Court first
motion for a mistrial over defense counsel's oppoarticulated the standard of manifest necessity as
sition. In opposition to the motion, defense counsel
had asserted that any prejudicial impact of his the basis for allowing reprosecutions after mistrials.
statement could be cured by instructing the jury to The Court in Perez faced the classic mistrial situadisregard it. But, in granting the mistrial, the trial tion, that of a hung jury, and decided that retrial
court made no explicit finding of necessity and .wouldnot be barred if "there is a manifest necessity
gave no more than a minimal indication 2o on the for the act or the ends of public justice would
record before the Supreme Court that the judge otherwise be defeated. ' 'as Subsequently, the manihad considered the question of necessity or the fest necessity requirement was held to have been
possibility of alternatives.
met in cases involving possible jury bias due to
The district court, in granting defendant's peti- outside events2 and in a case involving a court
tion for habeas corpus,2 felt that the controlling martial where the exigencies of war interfered with
factor was the absence of an explicit finding of
the summoning of witnesses.28 These cases gave the
manifest necessity.22 The court of appeals affirmed, requirement the flavor of outside interference or
but disagreed with the district court's emphasis on
circumstances beyond the control of the parties, an
the need for a formal finding of manifest neces- impression which was strengthened by Downum v.
sity.23 Instead, the Ninth Circuit based its ruling UnitedStates.2 In Downun, the Court refused to find
on the absence of any indication on the record that that a mistrial was manifestly necessary where a
the state trial court had even considered the neces- prosecutor had been unable to locate a witness, a
fact of which he had been aware prior to the
land, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). During the second trial, the beginning of the trial.
judge declared a mistrial based on an improper reference
However, in Go" v.UitedStates,3 ' decided prior
to the prosecution's conduct by the defense counsel in his to Doumnm, the Court held that a mistrial did not
opening statement.
bar further prosecution when it was a result of an
" You will hear testimony that notwithstanding
improper
line of questioning by the prosecutor.
the fact that we had a trial in May of 1971 in this
matter that the prosecutor hid those statements and
The Court in God emphasized the discretionary
didn't give those to the lawyer for George saying the
nature of such a ruling and the fact that, in this
man was Spanish speaking, didn't give those statecase, it worked in favor of, rather than against the
ments at all, hid them.
defendant's interests.?' Goni was thus the first case
You will hear that that evidence was suppressed
to indicate that the determination of whether or
and hidden by the prosecutor in that case. You will
hear that that evidence was purposely withheld.
not the defendant's interests were being served by
You will hear that because of the misconduct of the
a mistrial should be considered in questioning the
County Attorney at that time and because he withheld evidence, that the Supreme Court of Arizona
24 434 US. at 510 n.28.
granted a new trial in this case. App. 180-81, 184.
2 22 US. (9 Wheat.) at 579.
434 U.S. at 499.
2DId at 501.

21 In Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), the
Court applied the double jeopardy prohibition to the
states through the fourteenth amendment and hence a
federal habeas corpus review of a state double jeopardy
decision could be permitted.
2 434 U.S. at 502 n.8.
2' Arizona v. Washington, 546 F.2d 829, 832 (9th Cir.
1976).

27 Thompson v.United States, 155 U.S. 271 (1894);
Simmons
v.United States, 142 U.S. 148 (1891).
t5
Wade v-Hunter,336 US.684 (1949).
372 U.S. 734 (1963).
'367 U.S. 364 (1961).
31
The court emphasized that retrial after mistrials
would be barred primarily in cases where the mistrial
worked against the defendant. Idat 368-69.
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necessity of the mistrial ruling. This emphasis in
Gori on the discretionary nature of the mistrial
ruling was cited in Illinois v. Somerville,32 where a
judge aborted a trial because of a defective indictment. The Supreme Court in Somerville reiterated
its holding that the judge had broad discretion,
and although the mistrial was not declared solely
in the defendant's own interests as it had been in
Gori, the mistrial ruling did further a legitimate
state policy against amending indictments in midtrial. With a defective indictment, the Court asserted, there was no reason to continue the trial
because any guilty verdict obtained could be overturned at will on appeal. The dissent argued vehemently that the Court majority had failed to
take into account the defendant's right to pursue
a verdict of acquittal, a right the Court did not
include in its balancing process.ss
Prior to this term, the most recent case involving
the issue of double jeopardy implications of a
mistrial was United States v. Dinitz.3' In that case,
the trial judge had made misconduct by the defendant's attorney the basis for the mistrial ruling.
However, the Court decided the case on the ground
that the mistrial was the defendant's own choice,
based on three options given him by the trial
judge.s The Court ruled that the manifest necessity standard was therefore not applicable to the
case.
Arizona v. Washington is the first case to present
squarely to the Supreme Court the issue of whether
a mistrial caused by defense counsel's misconduct
and declared over the defendant's objection bars
reprosecution on the basis of double jeopardy. Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, noted that the
double jeopardy provision provides protection
against the practice of declaring a mistrial because
the judge or prosecutor fears the defendant may be
acquitted. The danger of this type of ruling led the
Court to apply the strictest type of scrutiny to
mistrials declared on the basis of the unavailability
of prosecutorial evidence or when there is a suspicion of narassment or tactical maneuvering by the
3410

U.S. at 462.
(White, J., dissenting).

3 Id. at 473-83
4424 U.S. 600

(1976).

an Id at 608. The Court in Dinitz cited United. States
v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971), where the Court had stated
that a defendant's own motion for mistrial could not bar
subsequent prosecution unless necessitated by prosecutorial or judicial misconduct. Id at 606. In Jon, the
Supreme Court ruled, in a plurality opinion, that a trial
judge who failed to exercise scrupulously his discretion in
declaring a mistrial had failed to meet the Perez standard
of manifest necessity and that a subsequent prosecution
would be barred.
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prosecutor36 The Court went on to note that at the
opposite end of the spectrum are cases involving
hung juries. In these cases, a trial judge's ruling
would be entitled to great deference. According to
the Court, the trial judge is in the best position to
assess the situation and thus should not be tempted
to force the jury to return an improper verdict by
his fear that a mistrial ruling would bar any further
prosecution. 7
The Court then applied its new analysis of the
standards for reviewing the manifest necessity of a
mistrial ruling to the type of situation which gave
rise to the mistrial in Arizona v. Washington. Mistrials

based on defense counsel misconduct were held to
be analogous to those involving possible jury bias.
Therefore, Arizona's factual circumstances were reviewed under the Court's policy of giving great
deference to the trial judge's analysis of the situation.3s It was not, according to the Court, the type
of situation which called for strict scrutiny of the
trial judge's decision. The Court found that the
record in Arizona showed that the trial judge acted
deliberately, responsibly, and in the exercise of
sound discretion. The Court therefore dismissed as
unimportant the failure of the state court to make
any finding on the necessity for the mistrial, holding that such a finding could be implied from the
record 39
.
The Court's decision did not pass without dissent. Justice White filed one of the two dissents and
noted that since the district court applied the
incorrect legal standard to the facts, the case should
be remanded to that court and not decided by the
Supreme Court in the first instance. 4° Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, dissented on the
belief that it was improper to imply a finding of
manifest necessity from a record which failed to
indicate any consideration of alternatives or of the
necessity for a mistrial on the part of the trial
judge." Marshall felt that a curative instruction
could very possibly have dissipated any prejudicial

effect of the prosecutor's remarks and that the
failure of the Arizona State court to consider such
an alternative indicated that there was no sound
exercise of discretion on its part relative to the
necessity of the mistrial.42 Marshall believed that
requiring on the record some indication that the
judge had considered the necessity for a mistrial
434 U.S. at 508.
at 509.
3 Id. 508.
at 516.
3Id.
4 Id. at 518 (White, J., dissenting).
41Id. at 520 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
42 Id at 521-22.
37 Id.
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567

would insure that the judge would not overlook to provoke a mistrial and thereby deprive the
this concern in making 'his mistrial ruling and
defendant of his right to pursue a verdict of ac43
would, additionally, facilitate appellate review.
quittal.46 Likewise, mistrial rulings for which there
In analyzing the importance of Arizona v. Wash- is no apparent necessity and which indicate a lack
ington to the development of the double jeopardy of discrimination on the part of the judge should
doctrine iivecked in mistrial rulings, it is important be subject to strict scrutiny for the same reason.
to note that prior to the case, mistrial rulings Such rulings tend to lend themselves to the abusive
reviewed by the Supreme Court were generally practice of declaring a mistrial whenever acquittal
addressed to the subject of juror bias or prosecu- seems likely.
torial misconduct or negligence. Apart from the
The Court, without any extended analysis,
ruling in Dinitz, which hinged on the mistrial being placed the situation giving rise to the ruling in
at the option of the defendant, misconduct on the Arizona within the class of situations including jury
part of the defendant or defense attorney had not bias and hung juries. While it is true that the basis
been the basis for declaring a mistrial.44 In deciding for the judge's declaration of mistrial was the posArizona, however, the Court has, for the first time, sible prejudice to the jury, the key to the proper
categorized its former decisions on mistrials into analysis of these particular facts should have been
two groups, cases which require strict scrutiny and the attempt by the judge to prevent an unfair
cases in which the trial judge's ruling will be given acquittal. Like the situation of prosecutorial misgreater deference. The basis asserted by the Court conduct, defense misconduct as a basis for a misfor this variation in the standard of review is that trial lends itself to abuse. The judge who rules that
certain types of cases offer more likelihood of abuse defense counsel's actions necessitate a mistrial
by the prosecutor or by the judge in attempts to could be trying to prevent an unfair acquittal
which is not reviewable on appeal." A declaration
prevent an acquittal.
With Arizona, the Court has placed defense mis- of mistrial which is based on the judge's perception
conduct among those situations where it is appro- that counsel has acted improperly could simply be
priate to pay deference to the ruling of the trial a mask for thejudge's opinion that there is a strong
court. Previous cases cited by the Court warranting possibility that the jury intends to acquit a defendsuch deference to trial court mistrial rulings were ant that the judge believes is guilty.
those involving jury bias or hung juries, wherein
The necessity for such mistrial rulings, based on
an unfair conviction was the likely outcome unless improper conduct by the defense attorney, was
the trial was aborted. The rationale for allowing recognized by the Court in United States v. Jorn:
the trial judge this larger measure of discretion was "Unquestionably an important factor to be considthat these situations did not lend themselves to the ered is the need to hold litigants on both sides to
type of judicial
the or prosecutorial
asisfor45 abuse which was standards of responsible professional conduct in
the basis for the double jeopardy concern. These the clash of an adversary criminal process."' 8 Admittedly, the courts must have the authority to
situations were neither provoked by the prosecution
to avoid a possible acquittal, nor were they the prevent the defendant's attorney from seeking to
result of a judge's decision to end the trial simply prejudice the jury unfairly. However, the possibilbecause the jury appeared ready to acquit a de- ity of the abuse of such power by the judge would
fendant whom the judge believed was guilty. The indicate a need for a standard of review closer to
common basis for the judge's ruling in the hung that of cases involving judicial or prosecutorial
jury and jury bias cases was the possibility of an overreaching, rather than the deference accorded
unfair conviction which could be overturned on ajudge's determination that a hung jury is unable
appeal, wasting the time and money of all the to reach a fair verdict.
The Court's opinion in Arizona appears to be in
parties.
line with two recent trends in Supreme Court cases.
On the other hand, prosecutorial misconduct
situations have been strictly scrutinized because of First, the Court has given increasing deference to
a Court fear that the prosecutor intended his acts
43 Id. at

526-27.
"See, e.g., Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973);
Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949); Thompson v.
United States, 155 U.S. 271 (1894); Simmons v. United
States, 142 U.S. 148 (1891); United States v. Perez, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824).
45 434 U.S. at 508.

46 Id
17In Fong

Foo v. United States, 368 U.S. 141 (1962),
the Court held that a verdict of acquittal in a criminal
case could not be reviewed by an appellate court without
offending the double jeopardy clause regardless of how
erroneous was the basis for the acquittal.
48400 U.S. at 485-86.
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state court rulings which implicate issues of state

policy and the orderly process of its courts. For
instance, this deference formed the basis for the
49
ruling in Illinois v. Somerville, where the manifest
necessity for a mistrial was caused by a state policy

disallowing mid-trial amendments of indictments.
In that case, the Supreme Court specifically included the implementation of a reasonable state
policy in its balancing test. 5°
Second, the Supreme Court has shown increas-
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tribunal. 54 This may possibly indicate that in the
future this right will continue to be restricted at
the expense of the government's right to an errorfree trial. The second major case decided in this
term involving the defendant's right to trial before
a single tribunal indicates a similar direction.
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A Two-TIERED TRIAL
SYSTEM IN JUVENILE COURTS

In Swisher v. Brady,ss the Court addressed the

contention that the Maryland Juvenile Court sysing reluctance to give defendants the benefit of
tem is unconstitutional because it allows the state
trial errors under the double jeopardy prohibition. to take exceptions from a master's proposed finding
51
In United States v. Scott, another case decided durof non-delinquency and demand a hearing on the
ing this term, the Court held that the government
record before a supervising Juvenile Court judge.
was entitled to appeal the mid-trial dismissal of an
The Court held that this type of system does not
indictment as long as the dismissal was not based
offend the double jeopardy constraint against secon a factual resolution relating to the actual guilt
ond trials.
or innocence of the defendant. According to the
In the Maryland Juvenile Court system, the vast
Court, the double jeopardy clause was not offended
majority of the cases begin with an adjudicatory
despite the fact that if the government prevailed
hearing before a master.' The master's findings
on appeal, a retrial would be necessitated.5 2 This
are then accepted, rejected or remanded with reccase overruled United States v. Jenkins,53 which had
ommendations by a supervising judge. If the state
established that the double jeopardy prohibition
or the juvenile desire, they may take exceptions,
barred appeal from a dismissal of an indictment
and, until 1975, could demand a hearing de novo
where retrial would necessitate the resolution of before the judge.
any factual elements of the offense. By overruling
In the instant case, after the state took exceptions
Jenkins, the Court in Scott broadened the governto the master's finding of non-delinquency for three
ment's right to appeal in situations where the judge
of the petitioners, the supervising judge ruled on
had made a possibly erroneous ruling in favor of
their motion to dismiss the exceptions. Ruling in
the defendant. Arizona v. Washington, in applying a
favor of dismissal, the judge declared that the
less exacting standard of review to the question of
system of allowing the state to take exceptions to
the necessity for mistrials, allows judges a greater the master's recommendation of acquittal offended
measure of freedom in terminating a trial when
the prohibition against double jeopardy. On apthere has been a trial error favoring the defendant.
peal,5 7 the Maryland Special Court of Appeals
By extending a less exacting standard of review
overturned the lower court ruling on the ground
to cases of mistrial based on a defense attorney's
improper conduct, the Arizona Court has also lowered the constitutional status of the defendant's
right to have his trial completed before a single
4 410 U.S. 458 (1973).

o A trial judge properly exercises his discretion to
declare a mistrial if an impartial verdict cannot be
reached or if a verdict of conviction could be
reached, but would have to be reversed on appeal

due to an obvious procedural error in the trial. If an
error would make reversal on appeal a certainty, it

would not serve "the ends of public justice" to
require that the Government proceed with its proof
when it succeeded before the jury, it would automaticallly be stripped of that success by an appellate court.
410 U.S. at 464.
5198 S. Ct. 2187 (1978).
uId. at 2191.
53

420 U.S. 358 (1975).

" An analogous situation has developed in equal protection cases. In that area, the Supreme Court has developed a rule that the more disfavored a classification, the
stricter the scrutiny to which it is subjected. See Craig v.
Boren, 423 U.S. 1047 (1976) and discussion in dissenting
and concurring opinions.
"98 S. Ct. 2699 (1978).
56 The district court in Aldridge v. Dean, 395 F. Supp.
1161, 1170 (D. Md. 1975), a case involving the same
issues but different juvenile petitioners, noted that in
1974, 5,345 adjudicatory hearings were held in the Baltimore Juvenile Court before the masters and only 327
were heard before the judges. Furthermore, the total of
cases heard before judges included cases previously heard
by masters to which the state or the juvenile took exception, demanding a de novo hearing before the judge.
57 Under the recent ruling in United States v. Scott,
98 S. Ct. 2187 (1978), the government may appeal in
criminal cases from a judge's ruling dismissing the case
as long as the basis for the dismissal is not one which
involves the actual innocence of the accused.
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that there was only one continuing trial in the court entertained the class action of Brady v.
Baltimore system and that the defendant was Swisher, s which sought an injunction declaring the
therefore only placed in jeopardy once.:8 The ju- Maryland law unconstitutional. The court issued
veniles then appealed, and the Maryland Court of the injunction and based its finding on the fact
Appeals affirmed on a different basis.59 The Court that though the master's findings were not final
held thaL jeopardy failed to attach at the master's and the state could not present its evidence anew,
hearing, since the master had no judicial power. 0
Having exhausted their state remedies, the jua. Authority
veniles petitioned the federal district court for a
1. Detention of Shelter Care.
A master is authorized to order detention or
writ of habeas corpus.6 t The district court in Aidshelter care in accordance with Rule 912 (Detenridge v. Dean dismissed the case as to the three
tion or Shelter Care) subject to an immediate
petitioners involved in the present Supreme Court
review by a judge if requested by any party.
case on considerations of ripeness, because no hear2. Other Matters
ing by the judge on the state's exceptions had yet
A master is authorized to hear any cases and
matters assigned to him by the court, except a
taken place. However, with respect to the remainhearing on a waiver petition. The findings, coning petitioners, the court granted the writ and
clusions and recommendations of a master do
declared that the Maryland system violated due
not constitute orders or final action of the court.
process because it subjected juveniles to a second
b. Report to the Court.
trial after a finding of acquittal. The court held
Within ten days following the conclusion of a
disposition hearing by a master, he shall transmit to
that double jeopardy attached at the time of the
the judge the entire file in the case, together with a
master's hearing. The court reasoned that a maswritten report of his proposed findings of fact, conter's hearing was identical in form and substance
clusions of law, recommendations and proposed
to those adjudicatory hearings initially held before
orders with respect to adjudication and disposition.
A copy of his report and proposed order shall be
the supervising juvenile court judge rather than
served upon each party as provided by Rule 306
before a masteres The court then found that allow(Service of Pleadings and Other Papers).
ing the state to present exceptions and obtain a de
c. Review by Court if Exceptions Filed.
novo hearing performed the same function and was
Any party may file exceptions to the master's
subject to the same abuses as a state appeal from
proposed findings, conclusions, recommendations or
proposed orders. Exceptions shall be in writing, filed
an acquittal by a criminal court.6
with the clerk within five days after the master's
Subsequent to the decision in Aldridge v. Dean,
report is served upon the party, and shall specify
the Maryland Court of Appeals amended its rules
those items to which the party excepts, and whether
to provide that the state could take exceptions to
the hearing is to be de novo or on the record. A copy
shall be served upon all other parties pursuant to
a master's findings but that it was not entitled to
Rule 906 (Service of Pleadings and Other Papers).
a hearing on the record before the supervising
Upon the filing of exceptions, a prompt hearing
judge unless the juvenile agreed to a hearing de
shall be scheduled on the exceptions. An excepting
6
novo. ' It was under this new rule that the district
party other than the State may elect a hearing de
In re Anderson, 20 Md. App. 31, 315 A.2d 540
(1974).
0 In re Anderson, 272 Md. 85, 321 A.2d 516 (1974).
'Jeopardy attaches in a jury trial when the jury is
impaneled and sworn. In a bench trial,jeopardy attaches
when the judge begins to hear evidence. The doctrine of
early attachment is a direct outgrowth of the defendant's
right to a trial before a single tribunal, and was held to
apply to the states in Crist v. Bretz, 98 S. Ct. 2156 (1978).
2156 (1978).
6
1Aldridge v. Dean, 395 F. Supp. 1161 (D. Md. 1975).
6 Id. at 1172-73. The district court noted that originally the cases involving serious violence were heard by
a judge rather than a master. Recently, however, due to
an increasing case load, cases involving serious violence
are frequently heard by masters. The court felt that this
fact supported its contention that the masters were indeed
independent factfinders. Id at 1170.
6aid at 1173.
r The present rule reads as follows:

novo or a hearing on the record. If the State is the
excepting party, the hearing shall be on the record,
supplemented by such additional evidence as the
judge considers relevant and to which the parties
raise no objection. In either case the hearing shall
be limited to those matters to which exceptions have
been taken.
d. Review by Court in Absence of Exceptions.
In the absence of timely and proper exceptions,
the master's proposed findings of fact, conclusions
of law and recommendations may be adopted by
the court and the proposed or other appropriate
orders may be entered based on them. The court
may remand the case to the master for further
hearings, or may, on its own motion, schedule and
conduct a further hearing relevant and to which the
parties raise no objection. Action by the court under
this section shall be taken within two days after the
expiration of the time for filing exceptions.
Rule 911, MARYLAND RULES OF PROCEDURE (1970).
0 Brady v. Swisher, 436 F. Supp. 1361 (D. Md. 1977).
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the juvenile was placed in jeopardy a second time
at the hearing on the record before the supervising
judge.6
On appeal, the Supreme Court, in an opinion
written by Chief Justice Burger, agreed with the
district court that the juvenile was placed in jeopardy at the adjudicatory hearing before the master.' The Court reasoned, however, that the proceeding before the master did not end until the
entry of judgment by the supervising judge and
that, therefore, the proceeding was one whole and
not subject to double jeopardy objections. The
Court pointed out that none of the reasons behind
the right of a defendant to have his case heard and
decided by a single tribunal were implicated in
this situation.68 The state was only allowed to
present its evidence once and therefore was unable
to refine or strengthen it. There was no enhancement of a risk that an innocent defendant would
be convicted since there was only one adjudicator
empowered by the state as a factfinder-that being
the supervising judge. Finally, because the hearing
was on the record and because thejuvenile's attorney rarely even appeared, this type of proceeding
could not have been used to harrass, embarrass or
subject the defendant to the expense of a second
trial.69
The Court distinguished this type of system from
the one in Breed v. Jones,70 in which the Court first
applied the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy to state juvenile courts. The Court
pointed out that Breed involved two distinct trials
before two judges, both of whom were empowered
to enter a final acquittal. In the situation at hand,
the Court found only one continuous proceeding,
culminating only when a final judgment was entered by the supervising juvenile court judge.
The dissent, written by Justice Marshall and
joined in by Justices Powell and Brennan, argued
vehemently that the Maryland system did not
employ one continuous proceeding but rather was
analogous to an appeal by the state of a criminal
at 1369.
67 98 S. Ct. at 2706 n.12.
6Id.

8 Id.

'0 355 U.S. at 187.
7"421 U.S. 519 (1975). Breed involved a situation where

a juvenile was first subjected to an adjudicatory hearing
in juvenile court to determine whether he had violated
any criminal statutes, after which he was found unfit for
treatment as a juvenile. He was then brought to trial as
an adult. The Supreme Court held that the double
jeopardy prohibition applied to juvenile court and that
California had violated the provision by subjecting the
accused to two trials for the same offense.
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conviction.71 In support of their conclusion, the
dissenters pointed out that the master performed a
fact finding function and that unless the state
raised exceptions, the master's judgment was virtually "rubber stamped" by the supervising
judge. 72 The dissent felt that the Court had
adopted a "continuing jeopardy" argument which
was indistinguishable from that employed by Jus73
tice Holmes in his dissent to Kepner v. United States.

As the dissent pointed out, this argument has been
consistently rejected by the Supreme Court as the

basis for state appeals of acquittals in criminal
74

cases.
The dissent argued, secondarily, that even if the
Maryland system did not offend the double jeopardy clause, it was offensive to due process because

it permitted ajudge who did not hear the evidence
first hand to enter the ultimate verdict. The dissent
cited Holiday v. Johnston75 for the importance of
hearing live witnesses rather than ruling from a
cold record.
As the dissent recognized, the right of a defendant to have his trial conducted by a single discrete
tribunal is implicated in this decision. While this
right is most often cited in connection with mistrials, the justification for such a rule also applies
to situations involving bifurcated trial systems such
as the one under consideration in Swisher. The rule
is an attempt to protect a criminal defendant
against undue harassment, anxiety and expense at

the hands of the state. 6 It also prevents the state
from refining and strengthening evidence. Finally,
it prohibits prosecutorial "judgeshopping" in an

attempt to find a judge who is favorable to the
prosecutor's case.7 All such practices enhance the
likelihood that a state, with its superior resources,
78
may obtain the conviction of an innocent person.
However, the Court in Swisher v. Brady addressed
71 98 S. Ct. at 2709 (Marshall,

J., dissenting).
"The District Court found that, except when the
state filed an exception, all of the masters' recommended
findings of non-delinquency had been approved by the
judge." 98 S. Ct. at 2711 n.5.
195 U.S. 100, 134 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Mr. Justice Holmes reasoned that double jeopardy was
not implicated in appeals from conviction by the government because the initial jeopardy only ended when there
had been "a final judgment in the court of last resort."
195 U.S. at 134.
74 See Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. at 534.
75 313 U.S. 342 (1941).
76 355 U.S. at 187.
7 Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377 (1975).
78Green, 355 U.S. at 187-88. This is especially likely
in the case ofajuvenile who often will not have even the
72

1978]
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these objections to trial before more than one tribunal and concluded that they were not implicated
by the Maryland system.
First, the Court found that there would be no
undue harassment, anxiety or expense resulting
from the fact that the juvenile's attorney need not
even appear before the judge at the second hearing.79 However, in Downun v. United States,so the
Court had held that a mistrial which involved a
mere two day delay and no repetition of evidence,
since witnesses had not yet been heard, could not
be justified on the grounds of manifest necessity.
Furthermore, the Court in Swisher failed to consider
the anxiety or harassment engendered simply by
the choice of the state to prolong the defendant's
uncertainty by taking exceptions to the master's
finding of non-delinquency, a finding which the
juvenile certainly hoped would put an end to his
ordeal.
As the Court correctly noted, Maryland's modified procedure does not directly offend the policy
against allowing the state to strengthen its evidence
by presenting it to a second tribunal, since the
Maryland system now allows only a review on the
record by the judge unless the juvenile consents to
a hearing de novo.81 This, as the dissent pointed
out, raises an additional question of due process.
The Court incorrectly failed to consider the due
process issue, basing its failure to do so on an
assertion that any due process objections to such a
system do not arise from the guarantees of the
double jeopardy clause.s8
However, North Carolina v. Pearceso is directly to
the contrary. The Pearce Court, in deciding the
constitutionality of the imposition of a heavier
sentence in a conviction on retrial following a
successful appeal, held that a defendant cannot be
forced to choose between constitutional rights. Yet,
in future situations mandated by the Swisher holding, the juveniles acquitted by a master under the
Maryland system will be forced into just such an
unfair choice. If they do not waive their double
jeopardy protection against giving the prosecution
a second chance to present its case, then they will
be forced to accept the findings of ajudge who has
not heard any of the evidence nor had an opporlevel of resources of an adult and to whom the government presents an even more intimidating figure.
" 98 S. Ct. at 2707.
"o372 U.S. 734 (1963).

at 436 F. Supp. 1361 (D. Md. 1977).
82.8 S. Ct. at 2707 n.14.
83395 U.S. 711 (1969).

tunity to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses.
Surely such a procedure raises grave due process
objections. Furthermore, the importance of such
live hearings have been stressed by the Court repeatedly. In Arizona v. Washington, 4 for example,
the court used the opportunity of the trial judge to
hear the arguments and evidence first hand as a
basis for a high degree of deference to his judgment.
But, in Brady, the Court appears to have forgotten
the Arizona concern despite its recent nature.
Moreover, due process considerations cannot be
divorced from an analysis of the constitutionality
of a juvenile court system. Beginning with In re
Gault,s5 the Court has applied constitutional protections to juvenile courts only where it feels due
process requires that juveniles be accorded certain
rights8 6 Thus, any consideration of double jeopardy in a juvenile court setting necessarily implicates considerations of due process!' The Maryland system, which requires the juvenile to choose
between having his fate decided by a judge on a
cold record or allowing the state an opportunity to
strengthen its evidence by a second presentation,
does not meet the due process standards set forth
in Gault.
Finally, the Supreme Court ruled that the Maryland system does not allow the state an opportunity
to convince a second factfinder after failing to do
so at the first hearing, because the Maryland law
gives the master no authority. Therefore, the Court
reasoned, the master is not a factfinder. 8 8 This
Court reasoning, though, exemplifies the type of
technicality that the court abjured in Arizona v.
84434

U.S. at 510-11.

85 387 U.S. 1 (1967). The right extended to juveniles
by the Court in this case was the protection against selfincrimination.
' McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971); In
re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
81
In Gault, the Court, after extended discussion of the
failings ofjuvenile court systems, concluded that the lack
of due process protection for minors could no longer be
tolerated on the tenuous basis that the proceedings were
civil and not criminal in nature, or that the state was
acting as parenspatria and not as an adversary. 387 U.S.
at 16. However, the Court did not require that juvenile
delinquincy hearings be procedurally equivalent to adult
criminal trials. 387 U.S. at 30. Instead, the Court discussed each procedural safeguard separately and analyzed whether a due process standard required that the
juvenile system be altered to incorporate that particular
safeguard. The issues presented and resolved in Gault
were the juveniles right to counsel, notice of charges,
freedom from self-incrimination, and confrontation and
cross examination of witnesses.
8 98 S. Ct. at 2707.
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Washington as a basis for resolving double jeopardy
issues. The state trial judge, who originally ruled
that the system he supervised offended the double
jeopardy provision, stated that:
[lit is impossible for the Judge .... who also carries

Nineteen states presently have master systems
much like that of Maryland.' These systems have

a full docket of cases himself, to exercise any independent, meaningful judgment in the overwhelming
majority of the many thousands of Master's orders
put before him each year.... With this being the
case it is difficult to see how realistically a Master
can be called only an adviser.... The Master conducts for all intents and purposes, full blown and
complete proceedings through the adjudicatory and
dispositional phases and ... as a practical matter he
imposes sanctions and can effectively deprive youngsters of their freedom.89

allow the prosecutor to demand a de novo hearing

The Court in Swisher, however, in failing to take

Also, some states, such as Kentucky, employ a
two-tiered system of inferior and superior criminal
96
courts. The Supreme Court in Colten v. Kentucky
held that such systems are not in violation of the
double jeopardy clause because the state is not
allowed to appeal from the inferior court's ruling.
It appears possible that by changing the nomenclature of the factfinders in such a system, the state
could give itself the right to appeal from criminal
convictions in the inferior courts. This possibility

account of the realities of the system, ignored the
important considerations that the master's role was
exactly analogous to that of the judge in the few
cases9° where the judge conducted the initial hearing.

The Court based its finding that there is only a
single adjudication before a single tribunal on a
theory of "continuity of the proceedings." Again,
though, a similar theory was rejected by the Court
in Kepner v. United States' and has been most recently rejected in a juvenile setting in Breed v.
Jones.92 The Court in Swisher attempted to distinguish these two cases by pointing out that the
master under the Maryland court rules had no
power to enter a final judgment. However, the
Court's attempt does not sufficiently deal with the
Kepner case since under Philippine law, a person
was not regarded as being in jeopardy in the legal
sense until there had been a final judgment in the
court of last resort. The lower courts were deemed
examining courts, having preliminary jurisdiction,
and the accused was not finally convicted or acquitted until the case had been passed upon by the
audencia, or supreme court. 93 In both Breed and
Kepner, the state argued that there was a continuing
jeopardy, based on its own characterization of its
system. The major distinction from these cases thus

seems to be that the Maryland courts passed their
characterization of their system into law.
89 Id. at 2711 n.5.
so In Aldridge, 395 F. Supp. 1161, the court noted that
in both cases witnesses were called and sworn and evidence was introduced and since the revision of the Maryland Code in 1975, both hearings before a judge and
those before a master are recorded.
91 195 U.S. 100 (1904).
92421 U.S. 519 (1975).
195 U.S. at 121.

now been exonerated from the charge that they
offend the double jeopardy provision of the Constitution. However, many states, such as Ohio, still
after a recommendation of acquittal by the master.95 The reasoning employed by the Court in
Swisher would seem to indicate that such a system
would violate double jeopardy constraints. How-

ever, the Court did not explicity so hold and did
not explicity affirm Aldridge v. Dean, where the
district court held that such a system did violate

double jeopardy rights. Therefore, the matter remains open to further litigation.

merely serves to emphasize the dangers arising
from the Court's restriction of the defendant's right
to a trial before a single tribunal.
CONCLUSION

The important constitutional right to trial before
a single tribunal, implicated in the doublejeopardy
provisions of the fifth amendment, has been relegated to a position of lesser importance by the

Court's Swisher and Arizona rulings this term. By
4 ALA. CODE § 12-15-6 (1975); ALASKA STAT. §
47.10.075 (1975); ARiz. REV. STAT. §8-231 (Supp. 1977);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-408,409,440 (1977); CAL. WELF. &
INST. Code §§ 247-52 (West Supp. 1978); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 19-1-110 (1973); DEL. CODE tit. 10, §921 (1974);
GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-701 (1976); MIss. CODE ANN. § 4321-29 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.025-029 (Vernon
Supp. 1977); NEB. REV. STAT. §43-236.01 (1974); NEV.
REV. STAT. §62.090 (1973); N.J. REV. STAT. §2A:4-12
(1952); N.D. CENT. CODE §27-20-07 (1974); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2151.16 (Page 1968); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
10, § 1126 (West Supp. 1978); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11,§ 50301 (Purdon Supp. 1978); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-207
(1977); UTAH CODE ANN. §55-10-75 (1974). Several of
these states do not explicitly provide for the taking of
exceptions by the state. However, none of the statutes
clearly prohibits state appeal from the master's or referee's findings. Given the ruling in Brady, the state courts
may decide that exceptions by the state are acceptable.
95
OHiO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.16 (Page 1968).
96407 U.S. 104 (1972).
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allowing a more lenient standard of review in
determining whether the trial court's declaration
of mistrial was manifestly necessary, especially in
situations arising out of defense counsel's misconduct, the Court in Arizona v. Washington opened the
door to the abuse of such mistrial rulings byjudges
who perceive the possibility of acquittal of a defendant they believe is guilty. Additionally, in
Swisher v. Brady, the Court indicated that it is
willing to allow states to subvert the defendant's
right to trial before a single factfinder by technical
designations which only disguise the underlying
reality of a system which allows state appeal from
criminal acquittals. Therefore, while Arizona merely

weakens the defendant's right to a single trial by
endorsing a less stringent standard of review in
dealing with certain exceptions to that right,
Swisher calls into question the future viability of
the right. Even under the new Arizona standard,
flagrant abuses by the lower courts of the mistrial
exception are unlikely to go uncorrected by the
Supreme Court. On the other hand, the very existeisee of the right to a single trial before a single
factfinder is undermined by the Court's sanction
of a trial system, such as the one in Swisher, which
allows a state to take exceptions. The Court in
Swisher significantly decreased double jeopardy
protection on the basis of a technical distinction.

